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Summary 
This thesis aims to clarify the effects of the minimum share capital requirement 
in relation to Swedish private limited liability companies. The “be or not to be” 
of a minimum share capital requirement has been debated for a long time, both 
in Sweden and abroad. 
 
Sweden and many of the European continental countries such as Germany has 
a tradition of requiring that entrepreneurs wishing to form a private limited 
company commit capital to it. The reasons are many, but protection for both 
adjusting and non-adjusting creditors is historically the most prominent one. 
Other reasons are that the share capital functions as an entry barrier, as capital 
maintenance rules and are a way of reducing transaction costs since the legal 
rules create a standard contract. As an entry barrier, the share capital is said to 
make sure that only serious entrepreneurs have access to the form of 
corporation and thus preventing the company form from being used for illegal 
purposes. This is one of the strongest arguments in the Swedish government’s 
proposition but has been criticized since many entrepreneurs might be lost due 
to a lack of capital. It has further been discussed, in the context of the share 
capital as an instrument signalling seriousness, whether financing by share 
capital or financing by debt creates the most credible companies.  
 
Anglo-Saxon countries such as England and the United States do not express 
the same belief in the minimum share capital’s function as creditor protection 
and has therefore abolished these requirements. Instead insolvency law is 
important and this allows the market itself to determine how to protect itself 
best, through different agreements.  
 
When looking at the European Union, attempts have been made to harmonize 
company law and in the Commission’s Draft Statute for the SPE company, the 
suggested European private limited liability company, the minimum share 
capital requirement was set to one euro. However, in the now suggested 
Presidential Compromise, the Member States themselves may choose a share 
capital requirement of 1-8 000 euros, a compromise that leads to the SPE 
company losing one of its signalments. Now, the advantage is primarily that 
the company is able to operate throughout Europe.  
 
The future is very interesting, with increased harmonization within the EU, the 
SPE company and an increasing amount of European companies incorporating 
in the UK. Sweden has several decisions to make and paths to choose from, 
and the minimum share capital requirement is central in this.  
 
This thesis shows that the minimum share capital requirement actually is an out 
dated concept. It does not ensure creditor protection even to the non-
adjustable creditors since the amount of equity has no relation to the amount 
of potential future tort claims or tax debts. This especially since when a 
financial crisis is discovered the share capital is probably long gone. The author 
is further quite fond of using insurances as an alternative to share capital above 
all to fulfil the demand for non-adjustable creditor protection.  
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Transaction costs are not something that should be considered when making 
law, this is strictly business and inquiries have shown that most creditors makes 
individual arrangements even if there is a share capital in the company.  When 
it comes to an entry barrier, the author finds it very peculiar that it is possible 
to buy limited liability when it should be earned. 
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Sammanfattning 
Denna uppsats undersöker effekterna av minimikapitalkravet i relation till 
svenska privata aktiebolag. Aktiekapitalets ”vara eller inte vara” är något som 
länge debatterats, i Sverige och utanför. 
 
Sverige och många av de kontinentaleuropeiska länderna, såsom Tyskland, har 
en tradition att kräva att entreprenörer som önskar att starta ett privat 
aktiebolag bidrar med kapital till detta. Skälen är många, men skyll för frivilliga 
men framför allt ofrivilliga borgenärer är historiskt sett det mest uttalade. 
Andra skäl är att aktiekapitalet fungerar som en inträdesbarriär, som regler för 
att kapital ska stanna kvar i företaget och att det är ett sätt att reducera 
transaktionskostnader eftersom lagreglerna utgör ett standardkontrakt. Som en 
inträdesbarriär ska aktiekapitalet bidra till att endast seriösa entreprenörer har 
tillgång till aktiebolagsformen och möjligen att hindra den från att utnyttjas för 
mindre lagliga eller lämpliga syften. Detta är ett av de starkaste argumenten i 
den svenska regeringens proposition men resonemanget har kritiserats 
eftersom man kan gå miste om många duktiga entreprenörer för att de saknar 
kapital. Vidare har det diskuterats, i sammanhanget att se aktiekapitalet som ett 
sätt att signallera seriositet till marknaden, om finansiering via aktiekapital eller 
skuld skapar de mest trovärdiga företagen. 
 
Anglosaxiska länder såsom England eller USA har inte samma tilltro till 
minimikapitalkravets funktion som borgenärsskydd och har därför slopat dessa 
krav. I stället spelar insolvenslagstiftningen en stor roll och detta gör att 
marknaden själv får avgöra hur den bäst skyddar sig, via olika typer av 
överenskommelser. 
 
När blicken vänds mot EU så har försök gjorts för att harmonisera 
bolagsrätten och i kommissionens förslag till stadga för SPE-bolaget, det 
föreslagna privata europabolaget, sattes minimikapitalet till en euro. Men i den 
nu aktuella presidentkompromissen kan medlemsstater själva välja vilket 
kapitalkrav de vill tillämpa, mellan en euro och upp till åtta tusen euros. 
Kompromissen gör att SPE-bolaget går miste om ett viktigt karaktärsdrag och 
nu är fördelen främst att bolaget kan driva verksamhet i de olika 
medlemsländerna. 
 
Framtiden är mycket intressant, med ökad harmonisering i EU, SPE-bolaget 
och fler och fler bolag från alla europeiska länder som väljer att skapa sitt 
privata bolag i Storbritannien. Sverige har flera beslut att ta och vägar att välja 
från och minimikapitalkravet är en central fråga. 
 
Denna uppsats visar att minimikapitalkravet är ett utdaterat koncept. Det ger 
inte något borgenärsskydd ens till ofrivilliga borgenärer eftersom aktiekapitalets 
storlek inte har någon relation till framtida skadeståndsanspråk eller 
skatteskulder, speciellt eftersom aktiekapitalet oftast redan är förbrukat när ett 
bolags ekonomiska kris uppdagas. Författaren förordar vidare idén om en 
obligatorisk försäkring som alternativ till aktiekapitalet för att framför allt 
fullgöra kravet på just säkerhet för ofrivilliga borgenärer.  
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Transaktionskostnader är inte något som bör övervägas i lagstiftningsprocessen 
då det gäller affärer och undersökningar har visat att de flesta borgenärer väljer 
att skapa individuella överenskommelser även om företaget i fråga har ett 
aktiekapital. När det kommer till en inträdesbarriär finner författaren det udda 
att det är möjligt att köpa begränsat ansvar. Det bör förtjänas. 
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Abbreviations 
ABF   Aktiebolagsförordning (2005:559) 
ABL   Aktiebolagslag (2005:551) 
BGB  Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch – German civil law 
BFL  Bokföringslag (1999:1078) 
CA   Companies Act 2006 (The UK) 
CC   Code Civil – French civil law 
CdC   Code de Commerce – French company law 
COMI  Centre of Main Interest (EU Standars) 
DGCA   Delaware General Corporation Act 
DLLCA   Delaware Limited Liability Company Act 
ECJ  European Court of Justice 
EIR  European Insolvency Regulation 
EURL  Enterprise unipersonnelle à responsabilité limitée 
GmbH   Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung – German 
company form with limited responsibility. 
GmbHG   Deutsches Gesetz über die Gesellshaften mit 
beschränkter hafting – German law for GmbH:s 
IA   Insolvency Act (The UK) 
LLC   Limited Liability Company – Company form in 
the USA with limited responsibility 
Ltd   Limited Company – Company form in the UK 
with limited responsibility 
RMBCA  Revised Model Business Corporations Act – 
company act in the USA implemented by most of 
the States. 
NJA Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv (Cases from the Swedish 
Supreme Court) 
SA Société anonyme 
SARL  Société à responsabilité limitée 
SE   Societas Europea – Public European Company 
SPE   Societas Privata Europea – Private European 
Company 
UG   Unternehmergesellschaft – Special form of 
GmbH. 
UFTA   Uniform Fraudelent Transfer Act, USA 
ÅRL   Årsredovisningslag (1995:1554) 
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1 Introduction  
The private limited liability company form exists in almost every country, in 
different forms. Common for them all is that they bring limited liability to their 
owners and is thus a company form to be preferred if an entrepreneur wishes 
to create a company without too much personal risk.  
 
In common in most of these countries when forming a company is that it is 
necessary to establish some kind of documents, which form the company’s 
constitution. Most often, the company also need to be registered in an official 
register. What differs between the countries is the amount needed as share 
capital. In the U.S., no capital at all is required. In the UK the famous and 
much used company form Ltd requires one pound.  
 
In continental Europe, the last decade had been a very interesting one. Many 
new company forms have arisen and most countries have opened up for the 
possibility to at least start a company with very little share capital. In Sweden 
the minimum capital was lowered from 100.000 SEK to 50.000 SEK.  
Furthermore, the EU has proposed a European private limited company, the 
SPE company, where the minimum capital requirement can be between one 
euro to 8.000 euros. Which minimum amount to require is up to the member 
states themselves.  
 
In the US, almost half of the companies on the New York Stock Exchange are 
registered in Delaware, since this state is very company friendly with a lot of 
competence in areas such as company law and of course requires very little 
from anyone that wishes to start a company. The registration process is swift 
and there is no capital requirement. The development in the US is sometimes 
called a race to the bottom and some authors have argued that we will see the 
same development in Europe.  
 
Sweden is, as an EU member state, in the midst of the debate. As with most 
legislation today, the European regulation on company law must be taken into 
account when making national decisions. For private limited liability 
companies, ABs in Sweden, the minimum share capital required by law is 
50.000 SEK. The reasons behind this regulation are, as we shall see, many and 
comprises of creditor protection, the wish to protect the AB as a serious and 
trustworthy company form, capital maintenance, reduction of transaction costs 
and the prevention of the AB being used for illegitimate purposes.  
 
During many lectures and seminars within the advanced course Comparative 
Company Law during the spring 2011, we have discussed the importance, or 
non-importance, of a legally required minimum share capital in companies with 
a limited personal responsibility. The advantages and disadvantages of the 
minimum share capital rules are the questions that this thesis will focus on. To 
make it a bit more practical, I focus on the Swedish share capital rules: its 
functions, problems and future. In order to problematize, I will thus focus on 
the reasons behind the rules concerning share capital in Sweden – the issues 
the legal construction is aimed at solving – and then examine how these issues 
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are solved in countries with a different legal construction and different 
amounts as their minimum share capital requirement.  
1.1 Purpose and outline 
The ultimate purpose of the essay is to analyze and discuss whether the 
Swedish legal construction is the best legal construction concerning minimum 
share capital requirements or if the rules should be changed.   
 
The first part of my thesis is aimed at finding the reasons behind the Swedish 
construction and the answer(s) to the question: Why does Sweden have a minimum 
share capital requirement and why is it set at 50.000 SEK?  
 
The second part of the thesis is aimed at finding how other countries do. I 
have chosen to look at the EU, some European countries and the U.S. The 
focus on this study is: How do countries with different legal constructions than Sweden 
solve the same issues that Sweden solves using a minimum share capital requirement?   
I will first present the view and many difficulties of the EU when trying to 
harmonize primarily the company law and as part of this, the minimum 
requirement rules. This part is important since I will later discuss the Swedish 
share capital rules in a EU context, and possibly as part of a corporate law 
competition between the EU Member States. During 2008-2009 the EU 
proposed a private European company and I will go through the proposed 
Statute for this company since it may soon be a reality and possibly a true 
competition for the Swedish AB. I will further present how the US, UK, 
Germany and France deal with the share capital and problems concerning this. 
The countries are chosen since they are interesting in Sweden both from a 
trade perspective and as possible ways to handle corporation law. Regarding 
the US I will focus on three sets of rules in the U.S. First the RMBCA and 
UFTA, since these are common corporate law standards in many of the US 
States. Together with RMBCA, I will focus on U.S. insolvency law since this 
law is common grounds to the whole U.S. and thus not exposed to 
competition in the same way as the company law. U.S. insolvency law deals 
with many issues concerning creditor protection and capital maintenance. 
Secondly, I will focus on Delaware, since many of the American corporations 
are incorporated in Delaware.  
 
The third part is a study of the theories behind and debates concerning 
different issues in context to minimum share capital requirements. I will 
present the different views on the functions of the share capital and the 
advantages and/or disadvantages with different legal constructions and capital 
requirements. 
 
In the final discussion, I will discuss which legal construction best solves the 
issues that Sweden today solves using a minimum share capital requirement.  I 
will thus relate back to the findings in chapter two and compare them to how 
other countries do. Hopefully, the literature I have examined in chapter five 
will help discussing the different alternatives and the consequences of these. 
This part will answer the question: Should Sweden keep the regulation regarding the 
minimum share capital requirement as it is or should changes be made? 
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1.2 Method and material 
Throughout the essay, a dogmatic method is applied, meaning that the analysis 
is based on legal sources such as statute, case law and doctrine. I attempt to 
give due weight to each source depending what legal system is treated. This 
means that regarding e.g. the EU great weight is put on case law. 
 
The obvious starting point for this thesis has been legislation. I have looked at 
the Swedish legislation together with the legislative history in order to get a 
complete picture of the regulation complex. Regarding the French and German 
legislations I have used English translations. When unsure, I have read the 
French legislation in French and thus been able to make sure that I understood 
everything correctly. I have also made great use of different websites, not as a 
source but as a means to understand how the legislation works. Since the 
author does not know German, the German legislation has been read in 
English. I have double checked the English version using literature and also 
some websites. The legislations in UK and the US I have read, sometimes with 
use of examples from websites not used as a source. Regarding the material 
from the European Union, I have made great use of the EU’s website where I 
have found the documents themselves, guides and general information.  
 
Illuminating cases from primarily the ECJ have been used to further 
understand the system and to show on a development not always written out 
in law.  
 
Textbooks and articles have been used for two reasons. The first reason is to 
further explain the different judicial systems, the consequences of these and 
certain key issues. The other reason is to get the authors’ opinions on issues 
such as the function of the share capital, transaction costs and how they see 
the future in Europe regarding company law. All of these opinions are mainly 
gathered in chapter five. The articles have been published in well renowned 
journals and are mostly written by professors in company or EC law. The 
articles are written in Swedish or English. Sometimes the articles have referred 
to sources in German and these sources I have not been able to check. 
However, the main argument is seldom based on these sources and thus I am 
comfortable in using the article anyway.  
1.3 Delimitations 
To keep the essay focused and relevant, I have chosen only to write about the 
share capital requirement in Swedish private limited companies. In the 
comparative study however, it has sometimes been necessary to look at the 
rules for public limited companies and other times there is no difference 
between public companies and private companies. 
 
Since this thesis is about the minimum share capital requirement, its functions, 
and issues and future, I will not, at any depth, discuss rules concerning e.g. 
creditor protection, transaction costs or capital maintenance. These are 
functions of the share capital and will at times be given a fair amount of space 
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and at times simply be mentioned. The purpose of this essay is not to 
problematize around these functions as themes in their own right, however 
important and interesting they may be, except when required while discussing 
the share capital.    
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2 The Swedish Share Capital rules 
This chapter will focus on Swedish company law. I will explain the basics of 
the Swedish Aktiebolag, AB, the history of the share capital and point on other 
possible ways to have a limited responsibility. I will thoroughly describe the 
many reasons behind the requirement of a minimum share capital, using 
legislative history, literature and some cases. In addition, the reasons for having 
50.000 SEK as the minimum amount required will be explained.  
 
The Swedish laws that are relevant in this context are Aktiebolagslagen (ABL), 
Årsredovisningslagen (ÅRF) and Aktiebolagsförordningen (ABF).  
2.1 Why an Aktiebolag? 
The limited company form is probably one of the reasons of the economic 
advances in the west during the last centuries. Its great significance is partly 
because of the financing of the company and partly because of the limited 
responsibility. In combination with the opportunity to trade shares, the limited 
company form is recognized by its economic flexibility.1 In Sweden, the limited 
company form is primarily the AB, which can exist as a public or private 
company.  
 
The point of most limited companies is simply that they grant their owners 
limited liability. Usually, the only risk an owner (shareholder) in an AB takes is 
that his or her shares might become worthless and the money ventured might 
be lost. You do not risk your or your family’s private economy.  
2.1.1 Other forms of incorporation  
In order to better understand the AB, I will shortly describe some alternative 
forms of corporation available in Sweden. I do not aspire to make a complete 
list, but simply to present some common possibilities.  
 
If you wish to run a business in Sweden, there are other types of company 
forms to choose from, with different advantages and disadvantages. However, 
if you wish to do so with a limited responsibility you can only choose between 
the following: 
 
• Limited Partner in a Kommanditbolag, 
• Member of an Economic Union, 
• Shareholder in an Aktiebolag, private or public, 
• Shareholder in a limited company in another EU member state, with a 
branch in Sweden.   
 
                                                
1 Lindskog 2000/2001, page 846 
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A Handelsbolag is a company form with two or more owners. The owners are 
personally and severally responsible for the company’s debts and contracts, 
which means that a creditor can ask any of the owners to pay and that owner 
will have to turn to the other owners to be reimbursed. A Handelsbolag needs 
to be registered by the competent Swedish authority2. A special kind of 
Handelsbolag is the Kommanditbolag where at least one of the owners (partners) 
has a limited responsibility and at least one has an unlimited responsibility for 
the company.3  
 
Soon the possibility to start an SPE-company, which will be described later on in 
this thesis, might be available to all Europeans. Today, the SE-company (public 
limited liability company form) is already in existence as the public limited 
European company form.  
 
An Economic Union is a special company form where the purpose is to take care 
of the members’ common economic interests. The members might be 
consumers, producers or suppliers of goods or services or contribute to the 
union in other similar ways. An Economic Union need to be registered and 
have a board. Its members’ responsibility is limited to their share or effort. 
Anyone who fulfils the membership requirements shall be allowed as a 
member.4  
 
Another type of very common company is the Enskild Firma, a company form 
with a single owner. The registration number of the company is the same as 
the owner’s personal identification number and thus the economy of the 
company is closely related to the economy of the owner. An Enskild Firma is 
not a legal person and only has to register at the competent Swedish Authority5 
if it wishes to have its name protected. It does not grant the owner limited 
liability.  
2.2 History of the share capital 
The first Swedish law concerning limited corporations came in 1848. In the law 
was a share capital requirement, but the amount of the share capital was not 
regulated. Since then, the share capital requirement has been revised a number 
of times. In 1885, the required minimum share capital was 5.000 SEK and it 
stayed this way until 1973 when it was raised to 50.000 SEK.6  
 
The raise to 50.000 SEK led to demands, especially from smaller businesses, 
that Swedish law should offer an alternative to the AB. An Inquiry presented 
its suggestion concerning Andelsbolag in 1974 and suggested a special type of 
AB. The Andelsbolag would give limited responsibility to its owners, and have 
a minimum capital requirement of 20.000 SEK. The Inquiry also suggested 
that the minimum share capital for an AB would be raised to 125.000 SEK. 
                                                
2 In this case, the Swedish Bolagsverket.  
3 BL. 
4 Lagen om Ekonomiska Föreningar, 1:2, 2:1, 3:1. 
5 Bolagsverket. 
6 SOU 2008:49, page 57-58. 
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However, the suggestion received a lot of negative criticism and was never 
carried out.7 
 
In 1995 it was decided that the limited company would now become two kinds 
of companies: the private limited company and the public limited company. For 
private limited companies, the required amount was raised to 100.000 SEK.8 
The reason for the split was mainly Sweden’s membership in the European 
Union. Many of EU’s Company Directives contained special demands on 
companies with several small owners, opposed to closely-held companies.9  
 
In 2005 a new ABL entered into force, but no changes were made concerning 
the share capital amount.  
 
During the year 2008 an Inquiry regarding the minimum share capital in 
private limited companies was commenced and the alternatives the Inquiry 
should take into consideration were to lower the share capital to 50.000 SEK, 
20.000 SEK or remove it completely.10 It suggested, for reasons described later 
in this chapter, 50.000 SEK. The reasons behind the Inquiry were, among 
other things, criticism concerning the difficulty to start an AB and the trend in 
the EU and the other Member States. The Inquiry writes about a possible 
competition in the EU after some crucial cases11 that Sweden might have to 
adjust to.12 
 
In 2007, the government gave a directive for an Inquiry concerning a less 
complicated AB.13 The Swedish government recognized the need of a company 
form with limited responsibility for smaller companies, possibly without a 
capital requirement. The Inquiry’s first task was to analyze the need of a new 
company form and consider advantages and disadvantages. The Inquiry 
presented its conclusions in April 2009.14 A new company form with limited 
responsibility was however not suggested, primarily because of the suggested 
SPE company form15 and that the Inquiry found it better to simplify some 
rules in ABL instead.16 It did not discuss the issue of the share capital due to 
the parallel investigation concerning this issue. 
2.3 Functions of the Swedish Share Capital 
The shareholders shall pay the share capital when the company is formed. The 
payment can be in cash or capital contributed in kind, e.g. a machine. Usually, 
the owners pay when they acquire their shares17. When payment is made 
                                                
7 SOU 2008:49, page 58. 
8 For public limited companies, the amount was raised to 500.000 SEK.  
9 Sandström, page 55.  
10 SOU 2008:49, page 56 ff. 
11 We will look at these cases in chapter 3.2 
12 SOU 2008:49, page 61-62. 
13 Dir. 2007:132. 
14 SOU 2009:34. 
15 See chapter 3.4 about the EU and SPE company form. 
16 SOU 2009:34, page 136 ff. 
17 ABL 2:3. 
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through contribution in kind, the company’s auditor must state that the 
contribution has been made, that it is of use to the company and that the value 
of the contribution is not entered into the accounts at a higher value than it 
should be18.   
 
In the company’s bylaws the share capital shall be defined and Swedish 
companies can choose to state a minimum and maximum share capital, to be 
able to enable flexibility without making changes in the bylaws. The number of 
shares, minimum and maximum, shall also be stated. 
 
The share capital shall be represented by a post in the balance sheet. 
2.3.1 Quote value of shares 
The quota between an AB’s share capital and the number of shares is called the 
quote value. When an AB is created the share capital as well as the number of 
shares is decided. When the new ABL was introduced in 2005, one of the news 
was the quota system that replaced the old system of nominal share value.19  
ABL 1:6 states that every share represents an equal part of the company and 
that this part is the share’s quote value. The system enables the share capital to 
be increased or decreased without having to give out new shares or take back 
old ones.20  
 
The share’s quote value can be changed without changes to the share capital. 
The number of shares can be increased or decreased. To expensive shares may 
be considered impractical and thus divided in two, a so-called split. A too low 
share value can be a problem for a company, e.g. because of transaction costs. 
In this case, shares may be fusioned, so that two earlier shares becomes one 
new with a higher value.21  
 
A share may not be bought at a price lower than its quote value.22  
                                                
18 ABL 2:19. 
19 Nominal value is when every share has a set, nominal value per share (Hamilton, page 
176). The nominal value system was motivated by the fact that in older AB:s shares had 
been given out that did not represent a paid amount, but simply the owner’s share in the 
company and the company’s assets. Since the share capital was considered the only base for 
creditors, legislators found it important to make sure that this base is somewhat consistent. 
The legislators thought that this could be achieved by settling a required minimum share 
capital in combination with a lowest nominal value per share. The purpose of the nominal 
value system was thus to secure a company’s non-free capital when the company was 
created or during an emission. That a decided amount was stated in money and written on 
the shares probably also made the shareholders feel more secure (NJA II 1895, page 58-59 
and Sandström, page 104).  
20 Sometimes it is necessary to notify the creditors when decreasing the share capital, ABL 
6:1.  
21 Sandström, page 105f. 
22 ABL 2:5 and 13:4. 
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2.3.2 Shareholder protection and obligations.  
The share is the base of the shareholder’s rights and obligations concerning the 
company’s economy and management. It symbolizes the shareholder’s part of 
the company.23 One of the arguments for the share capital is that it makes it 
easier to gain capital to the company. A lack of legal protection for investors 
might both decrease the opportunity for the company to get external financing 
and force the company to pay a higher interest.24 
 
In case law, especially in NJA 1947 page 647, the Swedish Supreme Court 
decided that when the limited liability gives unreasonable advantages or results, 
a personal responsibility might be put on the shareholders. There is however 
no clear definition of when this should happen. It could be when the 
shareholders run a business that is not separated from one of the shareholders’ 
own businesses. It could be when shareholders in an objectionable way have 
used the limited company form in order to minimise their own liability or it 
could be when the company obviously has insufficient funding.25 However, 
one should be careful when using the above-mentioned possibility.26 
2.3.3 Creditor protection 
As stated earlier, one of the distinguishing features of a limited company is the 
limited responsibility for the owners. However, this interest of freedom for 
shareholders must be considered in the light of the creditors’ interests: that the 
company is able to pay its debts.  
 
There are many types of creditors. Banks, suppliers, and the state (in the form 
of tax claims) are usual examples but there are also other types. An obligation 
can be created via non-contractual torts, and the employees are considered a 
creditor because of their interest that their payment claim is covered.27  
 
The share capital, together with the rest of the shareholders’ equity, creates a 
buffer between the assets and debts of a company to make sure that the 
company’s economic commitments can always be fulfilled.28 However, in its 
proposition29 the government stated that it is probable that creditors more 
often look at cash flow or liquidity than the share capital and the government’s 
proposition concluded that the protection of creditors is not the main reason 
for the minimum share capital requirement.  
 
Traditionally creditor protection is considered one of the reasons for the share 
capital30 and many of the rules involving the share capital is based on or have 
                                                
23 Sandström, page 98-110. 
24 SOU 2008:49, page 84. 
25 Andersson, page 204 ff.  
26 Prop 2004/05:85, page 207 f. 
27 SOU 2008:49, page 50 
28 Sandström, page 98-110. 
29 Prop 2004/05:85, page 10f. The proposition proposed a new ABL.  
30 See e.g. chapter 2.2. and Rodhe, Aktiebolagsrätt, page 19 where prof Rodhe (1909-1999) 
writes that since the creditors only have the company’s capital as security, it is necessary 
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consequences for the protection of creditors. For this reason, the following 
parts will explain the ABL rules connected to the share capital and creditor 
protection. The legislation protecting creditors in Sweden today may be divided 
into three: the contribution duty, the limitations in the company’s right to dispose over its 
capital and involuntary liquidation rules.31 In the following, we shall have a short 
look at the two first protection systems and which kind of protection it gives 
creditors. In chapter XXX we will go further in to the involuntary liquidation 
rules, since these rules protects many other interested parties as well as the 
creditors.  
 
2.3.3.1 The contribution duty 
The purpose of the contribution duty is that the capital the company officially 
have also should be contributed to the company.32 The payment of shares 
should happen when the company is created and may not be below the share’s 
quote value, ABL 2:15. As seen above, the payment might be made through a 
contribution in kind.  
 
The contribution duty is not only relevant at the creation of the company but 
also later on: regarding issuing of new shares or convertibles, ABL 11:1.  
 
2.3.3.2 Limitations to dispose of the shareholders´ equity. 
The limitation in a company’s right to dispose of its shareholders’ equity is 
divided into two principles: The cover principle, ABL 17:3, means that an asset 
transaction is only legitimate if there is full cover for the company’s equity after 
the transaction. The decision shall be based upon the latest balance sheet with 
consideration to later occurrences. The principle is meant to give the creditors 
a guarantee that the equity cannot be decreased through asset transactions.   
 
The second principle is the caution principle, also found in 17:3 ABL. Even if the 
asset transaction is compatible with the cover principle, the transaction will still 
have to be defendable considering demands that the extent, nature and risks of 
operations puts on equity, liquidity and the company’s position in all. The 
consequence of the caution principle is that a transaction might be smaller than 
what the cover principle would allow, but never greater. The size of the buffer 
needed must be determined for each individual company, taking into account 
e.g. the business cycle and the size of the shareholders’ equity. The caution 
principle further means that a company need to take its current costs into 
consideration. Asset transactions may not involve a sum so grand that the 
company deteriorates its ability to fulfil obligations and the company should 
still have a buffer in case of unexpected events. The caution principle is a 
standard rule, and there are unfortunately no cases to explain it further.33 
                                                                                                                        
that this capital is actually created when the company is registered and doesn’t disappear 
during the company’s operations. 
31 The same division is used in SOU 2008:49, page 9.  
32 Sacklén, page 138 
33 Karnov, comment to 17:3 ABL. NJA 1995 page 742 gives some guidance since it 
explains that the value the cover principle refers to is the value entered into the accounts, 
not the market value.  
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Section 17:3 and its principles can be applied to all kinds of asset transactions.  
2.3.4 Control of finances: the special balance sheet 
In ABL34 we find the rules concerning the liquidation of an AB, before it has 
severe financial problems. The main purpose of the rules is to put pressure on 
the board so that it acts in time. If the board has reason to suspect that half of 
the share capital is used, they have to create a special balance sheet that is to be 
audited by the company’s auditor, ABL 25:13.  
 
If the special balance sheet shows that half of the company’s equity is covered, 
the board no longer has a duty to act. However, if the special balance sheet 
shows that half of the share capital is in fact used, then an extra shareholders’ 
meeting is to be summoned. At the shareholders’ meeting the shareholders can 
decide that the company should be liquidated, ABL 25:15. If the meeting does 
not take a decision, the board will try to gain control over the economy during 
a maximum time of eight months. During this time the board is busy with 
plans of reconstruction such as discussing if the shareholders are able to 
contribute more capital to the company35.  
 
After a maximum eight months, the shareholders shall meet again to discuss a 
new special balance sheet, produced by the board and/or reconstruction 
officers, ABL 25:16. If the share capital is not fully covered, the company has 
to be liquidated, ABL 25:17.  
 
The members of the board might be held personally responsible if they do not 
act accordingly to what ABL demands of them, presuming they have been 
neglectful. The responsibility would comprise of the commitments the 
company has made since the point of time when the board did not follow the 
rules of ABL. The same responsibility applies to a person who, knowing that 
the board has not acted properly, acted in the company’s name.36 A 
shareholder might also be responsible together with the company for 
commitments the company made after he or she participated in a decision that 
the company should not be liquidated, knowing that according to law the 
company should be liquidated.37  
 
The rule is based on the idea that a company should not be allowed to be 
economically unstable during a longer period of time. If the company’s 
economic situation is not improved the company will be liquidated to protect 
creditors from even more damage.38 Another idea is that the rule should 
function as a warning and give time to acknowledge and try to sort out the 
company’s problem.39 
                                                
34 Chapter 25, section 13-20. 
35 Sandström, page 325. 
36 25:18 ABL. 
37 25:19 ABL. 
38 Skog, Rodhes Aktiebolagsrätt, page 83. 
39 Nerep, Aktiebolagsrättslig analys, page 471. 
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2.3.5 Transaction costs 
A transaction cost is all the costs connected to the main transaction, such as a 
purchase or loan. The most common transaction costs are the search- and 
information costs, bargaining costs and policing and enforcing costs.40 Obviously, the size 
of the transaction cost varies greatly depending on the type of transaction.  
 
Transaction costs are relevant to discuss in context of the share capital since 
the share capital has been seen as a way to decrease these costs. No 
requirement of share capital might lead to greater transaction costs since the 
company and creditors would be forced to make individual deals instead of 
relying on the capital existing in the company. Since individual contracts take 
more time and demands more research, the costs are greater than for a 
generalized contract and this might create problems, especially for the smaller 
businesses41.  
 
There are two types of creditors that are interesting in the transaction cost 
context: the adjusting creditors and the non-adjusting creditors. An adjusting creditor 
is a creditor that has the opportunity to make individual agreements with the 
company. It might be a bank considering giving a loan to the company or a 
supplier wishing to make business. The adjusting creditors are willing to incur 
the transaction costs necessary to adjust the terms upon which credit is 
extended so as to compensate them appropriately for the risk they are 
bearing.42 What they have in common is that they may choose whether or not 
to engage in business with the specific company. Examples of how these 
creditors protect themselves in Sweden are through keeping the ownership of 
their goods until full payment has been received, financial leasing and pledges.43 
Adjusting creditors might also ask for personal securities from the owners 
rather than from the company.  
 
Not every creditor has the opportunity to make individual contracts with a 
company and in that way decrease the risk they are taking concerning their 
claim towards the company. Tort victims are the most intuitive example of a 
non-adjusting creditor, but also the state has a claim for taxes and in some 
cases a wages guarantee can be counted as non-adjustable creditors.44  Non-
adjusting creditors thus need a greater protection than the adjusting ones, and 
the rules concerning capital protection of which the share capital is part might 
be seen as a standard contract for them.45 
 
A creditor that cannot be classified as either an adjustable or a non-adjustable 
creditor are the ones that, due to lack of knowledge, will or information, does 
not protect its own interests by making an individual contract with the 
                                                
40 A Dictionary of Economics: ”Transaction cost”.  
41 SOU 2008:49, page 84. 
42 Armour, page 5. 
43 Sacklén, 153ff. 
44 SOU 2008:49, page 83, Armour page 5.  
45 SOU 2008:49, page 83-84 Kraakeman et al, page 120.  
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company. These groups are called weak creditors and have to rely on the 
company’s capital.46  
2.3.6 Seriousness of entrepreneurs 
When proposing a new ABL, the government clearly stated that to protect the 
AB’s good reputation as a serious and credible company form is one of the 
main reasons for the share capital and the amount required.47 The government 
further wished to make the point that an entrepreneur that is not committed 
enough to the company/business idea to commit capital to it should be 
referred to other types of corporations.48 
 
The share capital might be a way of making sure that the entrepreneur has a 
well-developed business idea to which he/she is prepared to commit capital. In 
this aspect, the minimum capital requirement functions as an entrance barrier. 
It might also work as a first barrier to prevent the limited liability company 
form from being used for illegitimate purposes.49 
 
The Inquiry discussed the risk that an AB might be used for illegitimate 
purposes, such as different kinds of economic criminality. However, since all 
lines of business should abide by the same laws it would be difficult to raise the 
required minimum capital, since such a raise would also affect business 
branches with little problems concerning crimes. However, the Inquiry 
concluded that the minimum capital requirement would not put an end to the 
abuse of the AB company form, but might be a barrier for those persons 
wishing to use it for unserious purposes.50  
2.4 The minimum share capital amount  
As seen above, a private AB needs at least 50.000 SEK as share capital.  
 
The official Inquiry presented in 200851 a thorough discussion concerning the 
amount required as share capital. According to its directive, the Inquiry should 
investigate if the share capital requirement should be lowered from 100.000 
SEK to 50.000 or 20.000 SEK or to be kept unchanged.   
 
The Inquiry concludes that the share capital requirement should be lowered to 
make the AB more accessible to all. They discovered that four out of five 
companies that started in 2006 were within the service sector, where capital is 
less necessary. 
 
According to the Inquiry, the statutory minimum share capital has the 
disadvantage that there is no connection between this more or less randomly 
determined amount and the capital requirements and risks connected to the 
                                                
46 SOU 2008:49 page 83 and Armour, John, pages 15-20. 
47 Prop 2004/05:85, page 11 
48 Prop 2004/05:85, page 212 
49 SOU 2008:49, page 11 
50 SOU 2008:49, page 86.  
51 SOU 2008:49 
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individual company. If the statutory minimum requirement was to be removed, 
the share capital would be determined by the shareholders themselves in 
proportion to the extent and nature of the operations. 
 
The Inquiry also observed the transaction costs, as we have seen above. The 
conclusion was that no requirement of share capital might lead to greater 
transaction costs since the company and creditors would have to make 
individual deals. These creditors would ask more of the company and maybe 
demand guarantees from the owners. If the share capital requirement was 
completely removed, it would likely be replaced by contracts. Since individual 
contracts take more time and demands more investigations and materials, the 
costs are greater than for a generalized contract. 
 
The conclusion of the Inquiry was that there was no reason to remove the 
minimum share capital requirement in Sweden, but that the limited liability 
company form should be made more accessible by lowering the amount 
required. The amount of 50.000 SEK was chosen since the Inquiry believed 
that a reduction to less than 50.000 SEK would increase the demands from 
creditors for securities, capital contributions and information. The Inquiry also 
believed that it was an appropriate amount out of the perspective that some 
creditors cannot make individual deals with the company, that it would 
function well as a entry barrier to entry and that the lower the capital 
requirement is, the greater the risk of the company entering into an involuntary 
liquidation situation which should be avoided.52 
 
 
                                                
52 SOU 2008:49, page 22 
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3 The EU 
3.1 Introduction to the EU  
Today, the Swedish legislation and case law are obviously much influenced by 
the European Union. The EU is trying hard to harmonize the European 
company law and its many Company Directives have had some success in 
doing this. In order to get a better overview of the EU regulations, this part of 
the chapter will describe the basic common company law. However, since this 
thesis does not focus on public companies, large parts of this EU law are 
irrelevant. In order to be able to analyze the Swedish share capital rules out of 
an EU and EU Competition perspective later on, I will also write about the 
interpretation of the freedom of establishment for companies, using some 
cases. I will then move on to describe the proposed private limited European 
Company, the SPE.  
 
Share capital rules have traditionally been among the cornerstones of EU 
company law. Already the Second Company Directive 1976 concerned the 
formation and maintenance of a share capital. Lately however, these rules, 
theories and ideas have created a debate among European Scholars. When the 
Commission set up a High Level Group of Company Law experts in 2001, it 
recognized the debate and asked the Group to investigate the share capital 
rules. Since then, the debate has been more vivid than ever.53  
 
The view on the function and purpose of company law differs between the 
Member States. In the continental company law, it is important to protect the 
stakeholders in general and the company’s creditors especially. In the Anglo-
Saxon company law, it is believed that the different parties can protect 
themselves best through different agreements and the focus is on flexibility 
and availability.54  
 
The two theories deciding a company’s nationality are the real seat theory and the 
incorporation theory and in Europe we have supporters of both, which explains a 
large part of the complex of problems regarding freedom of establishment for 
companies.  
 
The real seat theory is practiced by e.g. Germany, France, Spain and Italy and 
means that a company must have its real seat in the country where it is also 
registered. A company is considered to have a legal personality only if this 
demand is fulfilled. The purpose of the real seat theory is to protect national 
interests through protecting creditors and other stakeholders, such as 
employees. The disadvantage of the real seat theory is that it might be 
uncertain where a company has its real seat. A consequence of the real seat 
method is that if the company decides to move its real seat to another country, 
it will no longer have a legal personality. A consequence of this is that the 
                                                
53 Mulbert and Birke, page 2.  
54 SOU 2008:49, page 81. 
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company representatives might be personally responsible for commitments the 
company made after moving its seat.55 
 
The incorporation theory on the other hand is practiced by e.g. Sweden, the 
UK, Denmark and the Netherlands. It means that a foreign company is 
considered a legal personality under national law if the company has that status 
in its country of registration.56 There is no uncertainty when considering a 
company’s legal personality.  
 
It is thus often impossible to move a company in itself between the different 
Member States.57  What companies can do is to register in the Member State 
that suits the company best and uses the incorporation method. The company 
can then create a branch in the Member State it wishes to operate in.58  
 
The fundamental four freedoms59 and cases such as Centros60, Überseering61 
and Inspire Art62 make sure that there is some freedom of establishment in 
Europe. These cases are interesting in order to understand how a Swedish AB 
may move within the EU and whether a foreign company may move its 
business to Sweden. This is important to understand in order to better discuss 
the future of the Swedish minimum share capital requirement, in regard to a 
possible EU competition.  
3.2 Cases 
3.2.1 Daily Mail, 198863 
Daily Mail (UK) is primarily a tax-law case but has some interesting company 
law issues as well. Daily Mail wished to move its de facto head office (and tax 
residence) to the Netherlands because of the more favourable tax rules there, 
while at the same time it planned to remain a company under UK Company 
Law. The UK Treasury Dep. refused permission for the transfer of seat, which 
is necessary to receive under UK law. The UK supports the incorporation 
theory. 
 
Because of the refusal, Daily Mail referred the question to the ECJ: whether 
the EC Treaty precludes a member state from obstructing the transfer of the 
de facto head office from a member state.   
 
The ECJ concluded that the freedom of establishment is one of the four 
freedoms and should also apply to companies. However, a company only exists 
                                                
55 Dotevall, SvJT 2006, page 885. 
56 Dotevall, SvJT 2006, page 885. 
57 Pehrson, Kan aktiebolag flytta?, page 89f. 
58 Dotevall, SvJT 2006 page 886. 
59 EC Treaty art 3.3 
60 Case C-212/97 Centros Ltd v. Erhervs-och Selskabsstyrelsen.  
61 Case C-208/00 Überseering BV v. Nordic construction Company Baumanagement  
GmbH 
62 Case C-167/01 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd.  
63 Case 81/87 1988. All information is from the case text.  
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according to the national law of the country in which it is registered. Finally, 
the ECJ states that the EC Treaty does not in itself give company’s the right to 
move its head office. It also stated that this problem needs to be solved 
through further harmonization.  
 
The principles of Daily Mail were reaffirmed by the ECJ in 2008, in the case 
Cartesio64. The court stated that: “As Community law now stands, articles 43 
EC and 48 EC are to be interpreted as not precluding legislation of a member 
state under which a company incorporated under the law of that member state 
may not transfer its seat to another member state whilst retaining its status as a 
company governed by the law of the member state of incorporation”. 
3.2.2 Centros, 1999 
Two Danes established Centros Ltd under UK company law, but the company 
was only active in Denmark. The owners clearly stated that they had 
established the company under UK company law solely to avoid the minimum 
capital requirement for Danish limited liability companies. However, the 
Danish commercial registry considered this to be an unlawful circumvention of 
Danish law and refused to register the company’s branch office in Denmark. 65 
 
First, the ECJ ruled that when a company exercises its freedom of 
establishment under the EC Treaty, the Member States are prohibited from 
discriminating against this company on the grounds that it was formed in 
accordance with the law of another member state in which it has its registered 
office but does not carry on any business. Second, a state is not authorized to 
restrict freedom of establishment on the ground of protecting creditors or 
preventing fraud if there are other ways of countering fraud or protecting 
creditors. Besides, the Court points to the availability to member states of the 
option of adopting EC harmonizing legislation in this area of company law. 
 
Thus, the ECJ concluded that a Member State has to recognize a branch of a 
company incorporated in another state, even if the local branch is the only part 
of the company that is actually doing business.  
 
Later, the case Cadbury Schweppes from 200666 modifies the principle a little. 
In this case Cadbury Schweppes had established two subsidiaries in Ireland 
solely in order to gain from Ireland’s more favorable tax rules. The ECJ stated 
that a restriction of freedom of establishment is possible in cases of a 
“letterbox” or “front” subsidiary. A company cannot invoke freedom of 
establishment in another member state for the sole purpose of benefiting from 
more advantageous legislation unless the establishment in the other member 
state is intended to carry out genuine economic activity.  
 
                                                
64 Case C-210/06 Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt.  
65 C-212/97 Centros Ltd v. Erhervs-och Selskabsstyrelsen. All information is from the case 
text.. 
66 Case C 196/04 Cadbury Schweppes plc & Cadbury Schweppes Overseas Ltd v. 
Commissioners of Inland Revenue. 
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3.2.3 Überseering, 2002 
All the directors of Überseering BV, a limited liability company under Dutch 
law, were resident in Germany. As a consequence the German courts decided 
that German corporate law applies to the company, since the location of the 
head office was in Germany. For this reason Überseering did not have a legal 
personality in Germany and was dismissed from court proceedings. 67 
 
The ECJ ruled that it was incompatible with the freedom of establishment to 
deny legal capacity to a company formed in one member state, which moves its 
central place of administration to another member state. The ECJ also stated 
that when a company incorporated in another member state exercised its 
freedom of establishment in another member state, that other member state is 
required to recognize the company’s legal capacity, which it enjoys under the 
laws of its state of incorporation.  
 
The conclusion in Überseering was thus that a limited company registered in a 
country using the incorporation principle shall be recognized also in countries 
using the real seat theory.   
3.2.4 Inspire Art, 2003 
A person from the Netherlands established Inspire Art Ltd under UK 
company law and requested the registration of the company’s Dutch branch 
office in the Netherlands. The registry decided that specific Dutch rules for 
foreign entities registered in the Netherlands would apply. As a consequence, 
Inspire Art would have been required to use a company name indicating its 
foreign origin and comply with the minimum capital requirements for Dutch 
Limited Liability Company.68  
 
The ECJ stated that a foreign company is not only to be respected as a legal 
entity having the right to be a party to legal proceedings, but rather has to be 
respected as such. That is, as a company that is subject to the company law of 
its state of incorporation. Any adjustment to that foreign company law of the 
host state is hence not compatible with European law.  
 
Inspire Art resulted in that a Member States cannot, through special rules 
regarding foreign companies, have higher requirements than the country of 
registration e.g. regarding share capital or the board’s responsibility towards 
creditors. 
 
It is also interesting that in the Inspire Art case, the Court states that creditors 
primarily must protect its own interests by gathering information about the 
company it is doing business with. The Court does not however have a 
standpoint in the question of whether or not the requirement of a share capital 
is a good construction for creditor protection. 
                                                
67 C-208/00 Überseering BV v. Nordic construction Company Baumanagement  
GmbH All information is from the case text. 
68 C-167/01 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd. All 
information is from the case text.   
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3.3 EC Insolvency Law: the EIR 
There are strong complementarities between company law and insolvency law, 
as we will see throughout this thesis. 
 
Independently of other corporate law developments, such as the cases referred 
to above and other harmonization initiatives, the European Community 
adopted an important regulation on insolvency proceedings, the European 
Insolvency Regulation. The EIR mainly aimed to enhance cooperation among 
EU courts in bankruptcy law by introducing some common rules in an 
interjurisdictional framework that was, until then, characterized by strictly 
territorialist solutions. The EIR uses the centre of main interest, the COMI 
standard, to determine which Member State has jurisdiction to open main 
insolvency proceedings and identifies the law applicable as the law of that 
State. EIR introduces the principle of mutual recognition of insolvency 
proceedings, contains rules on information for creditors and on the lodgment 
of their claims. The law has been critizesed for being fuzzy and that it has led 
to new forum shopping opportunities in bankruptcy law.69  
 
Despite COMI’s key role in determining jurisdiction and solving conflict of 
laws in insolvency, there is no definition of COMI in the text. It is presumed 
that for companies and legal persons the place of the registered office is the 
centre of main interests in the absence of proof to the contrary.70 
 
The conclusion regarding the EIR is that it offers ex post forum shopping 
opportunities that the different EU bankruptcy systems will have to deal with. 
Although vague, the COMI standard is here to stay and consequently, forum 
shopping might hurt some creditors. However, States will probably not actively 
compete to attract bankruptcies.71  
3.4 The SPE-company 
The summer 2008, the European Commission presented a proposal for a 
Council regulation on the statute for the private European company, a so 
called SPE company.72 In March 2009, the European parliament passed a 
resolution approving the proposal in an amended version, the EP Draft. Thus, 
the debate shifted to a Council level. During the Swedish Presidency in 
December 2009, the Council submitted a compromise proposal73 but 
unanimity was not reached. The Precidency priorities state that all efforts will 
be made to reach an agreement on the Regulation.74 When referring to the SPE 
Statute in this thesis, it is the Presidential Compromise that is meant.  
 
                                                
69 Enriques and Gelter, page 2 and 10.  
70 Enriques and Gelter, page 10.  
71 Enriques and Gelter, page 16.  
72 COM/2008/396. 
73 The so-called Presidency Compromise. 
74 Siems et al, page 2. 
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The new company form will enable small- and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs) to do business throughout the EU. The proposal aims to reduce 
compliance costs on the creation and operation of businesses arising from the 
disparities between national rules both on the formation and on the operation 
of companies. It would also reduce the administrative burden for SMEs 
wishing to operate in several Member States.75  
 
The SPE Statute provides a set of company law rules related to the company 
form. It does not regulate matters related to labour law, tax law, accounting, or 
the insolvency of the SPE. Nor does it deal with contractual rights and 
obligations of the SPE or those of its shareholders other than those deriving 
from the articles of association of the SPE. The Statute and appendix should 
cover most occurrences; if not the national legislation in the country where the 
SPE is established will be a complement.76 The SPE Statute’s approach to leave 
more and more questions open and let the different Member States decide has 
been criticized since this means that the SPEs across the EU will be very 
dissimilar.77  
 
In order to facilitate start-ups, the regulation sets the minimum capital 
requirement at one euro78. The proposal departs from the traditional approach 
that considers the requirement of a high minimum of legal capital as a means 
of creditor protection. Studies show, the commission says, that creditors 
nowadays look rather at aspects other than capital, such as cash flow, which are 
more relevant to solvency. Director-shareholders of small companies often 
offer personal guarantees to their creditors and suppliers also use other 
methods to secure their claims, e.g. providing that ownership of goods only 
passes upon payment. Moreover, companies have different capital needs 
depending on their activity, and thus it is impossible to determine an 
appropriate capital for all companies. The shareholders of a company are the 
best placed to define the capital needs of their business.79  
 
Something quite special for the SPE Company is that it has to state its capital 
on its entire letters, order forms and its website. This guarantees transparency 
and may also be a positive signal to creditors and others dealing with the 
company.80 
 
One of the main characteristics of the SPE is that the company might be 
moved between the member states whilst keeping its legal personality. The 
company may not move if it is subject to liquidation, insolvency or other 
similar situations. When a move is made, the member state need to, through a 
special authority, examine whether the move is legal according to the statute. If 
yes, the company should be registered in the new member state and seize to be 
                                                
75 European Commission homepage on the European Private Company.  
76 SPE Statute, page 2.  
77 Siems et al, page 7.  
78 However, Member States have the freedom to demand up to 8.000 euros for the SPE:s 
registered in their territory. This had been criticized since the general aim is to establish the 
SPE in a manner as uniform as possible. See Siems et al, page 7.   
79 COM/2008/396, page 7 (and article 19.4). 
80 SPE Statute, art 11 (2)(c), and Siems et al, page 7.  
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registered in the original state.81 However, it has been pointed out that the 
statute might be interpreted as possible for a company to have its registered 
and real seat in two separate member states.82 
 
The shareholders enjoy a high degree of freedom in determining the internal 
organization of the SPE and there is no obligation to hold physical general 
meetings. The method for decision-making is to be described in the article of 
association. The Regulation ensures two specific minority rights for the 
shareholders: the right to request a shareholders' resolution and the right to 
request the competent court or administrative authority to appoint an 
independent expert, presumably an auditor.83  
 
The Regulation imposes on directors the duty of acting in the best interests of 
the company. Accordingly, directors' duties are owed to the SPE and may only 
be enforced by the company. The Regulation does not give individual 
shareholders or creditors the right to directly sue the members of the 
management body. It lays down a general standard of care by requiring from 
directors the care and skill reasonably required in the conduct of business. The 
Regulation establishes directors' liability for any loss or damage suffered by the 
SPE due to the breach of their duties deriving from the Regulation, articles of 
association or a resolution of shareholders. However other aspects of liabilities, 
e.g. the consequences of the breach of duties or any business judgment rule, 
are governed by national law.84 
 
The SPE Statute prescribes that the amount of a distribution may not exceed 
the last financial year’s profits plus any profits brought forward and reserves 
available for distribution minus any losses carried forward and restricted 
reserves.85 This essentially limits distributions to the SPE’s accumulated 
profits.86 The Statute also allows the Member States to require a solvency 
statement which the directors need to sign at least 15 days before the 
shareholders’ meeting. The certificate has to be disclosed in accordance with 
national law.87  
 
The name of an SPE shall be followed by the abbreviation SPE.88 
                                                
81 SPE Statute, art 36 
82 D.F.M.M. Zaman et al., page 176. 
83 COM/2008/396, page 8. 
84 COM/2008/396, page 9. 
85 SPE Statute, art 21 (c). In the Commission’s Draft, a balance sheet test was necessary: 
i.e. after the distribution the company’s assets fully cover its liabilities. Since a solvency 
test  on dividends only exists in few Member States, the proposal does not make it 
mandatory for SPE:s. However, it explicitly allows shareholders to provide for a solvency 
test in the articles, in addition to the balance-sheet test that is required by the regulation.  
The statute does not define “assets” or “liabilities”, in this aspect the relevant accounting 
provisions apply.    COM 2008/396, page 8. The accounting principles are defined in the 
Fourth Directive (78/660/EEC) or Regulation EC 1606/2002. 
86 Siems et al, page 8.  
87 SPE Statute, art XXX, Siems et al, page 8.  
88 COM/2008/396, page 17 (article 6).  
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4  Comparisons 
When choosing which countries to focus on in this chapter the author tried to 
find countries based on other legal traditions than Sweden, countries with a 
somewhat different view of the share capital functions and countries with 
other types of solutions. The author also wished to use countries that have a 
great influence on Sweden, e.g. by being a large member of the EU or by doing 
a lot of trade with Sweden. After researching these criteria the author decided 
upon the UK, since the Ltd is very common in Sweden and the rest of Europe, 
France and Germany, since they have different views in many company law 
aspects. All of these three countries have different requirements regarding the 
minimum share capital. The author has also chosen to focus on the US. The 
US have had common company law acts for many years but are still made up 
of partly independent states. Also, the author finds it impossible to discuss a 
future “European Delaware” without actually explaining the background and 
company climate in Delaware today.  
4.1 The United Kingdom 
The private limited company (Ltd) is a famous form of corporation that brings 
limited liability to the owners. Both the Ltd and the Plc (Public Limited 
Company) are regulated in the Companies Act 2006’s 1.300 sections. The 
minimum share capital for an Ltd is one pound. There is little difference 
between forming a public and a private corporation in the UK and all 
companies are considered private companies, unless they are registered as 
public companies.89 
 
The first limited liability company was created with the Limited Liability Act 
1855. The required minimum capital was 20.000 GBP, a huge amount in 1855. 
However, already in 1856 the demand for a capital was removed through the 
Joint Stock Companies Act. The reason was that the capital requirement was 
believed to be an unnecessary protection, since it only protected large, wealthy 
companies. In 1907 the private limited liability company form was introduced 
and a private Ltd had to register as such. This changed in 198090, when the 
public Plc had to be specifically registered instead. When the EU through the 
Second Company Directive91 demanded a minimum capital in public 
companies, the UK had to comply and from 1980 a Plc requires 50.000 pounds 
as share capital. From October 1st 2009, CA 2006 applies in the UK. Some 
changes were made for Ltd:s, but not in relation to the share capital which 
continued to be one pound.92  
 
The capital rules in CA 2006 are based on a distinction between the authorized 
and the issued share capital. The issued share capital is represented by the shares 
                                                
89 Andenas and Woolridge, page 53 and 110. 
90 Through the CA 1980.  
91 Art 6.  
92 GLÖM INTE SKRIVA NER KÄLLAN: DET VAR DEN BLÅ BOKEN PÅ 
STADSBIBL.  
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that the company has actually given out. The authorized share capital is usually 
a higher amount than the issued share capital, since this enables the company 
to extend their capital in the future, without a shareholders’ meeting.  
The Ltd must have one owner and thus also at least one share in issue. It is 
however not necessary, but quite common93, for an Ltd to state an authorized 
share capital.94  
 
An Ltd may postpone the payment of the share capital and there is no time 
limit as to when the payments must be made, this is up to the founders. The 
payment can be made in cash or contributed in kind.95  
 
Through the Companies Act 2006, private companies are not required to hold 
an annual meeting and are thus not required to lay copies of its accounts and 
reports before such a meeting. The auditor’s report on the annual accounts 
must instead be sent out to the members.96  
 
Since UK legislation requires such a small share capital, the protection for the 
company’s creditors is mainly found in the insolvency law.97 Wrongful trading is 
one of these insolvency rules98 and means that management and so-called 
shadow directors99 can be responsible to pay for those commitments the 
company has made after the person in question understood “that there was no 
reasonable prospect that the company would avoid going into insolvent 
liquidation”. For this reason, it is very important that the board and others in a 
leading position take their responsibility and keep themselves informed about 
the company’s finances (and book-keeping). The rules regarding wrongful 
trading is also said to make sure, at least in theory, that no companies are 
created with too little capital.100  
 
The difficulty with wrongful trading is mostly to determine the time when the 
management should have understood that the company was insolvent and 
proving this in court.101 Another difficulty is that it is not demanded that 
management persons have the same knowledge that an accountant, which 
might in some cases be necessary in order to understand that the company had 
financial problems. Thus, it creates problems to decide what a manager can be 
expected to understand.102 Following the leading case Re Continental Assurance 
Company of London plc, Singer v. Beckett103, a board member does not have to do 
much to clarify and understand the company’s economic situation.  
                                                
93 E.g. the authorized share capital is set to £1000, with a thousand shares and a nominal 
value of £1 per share. The issued share capital is set to £1 (SOU 2008:49, page 72).  
94 SOU 2008:49, page 72. 
95 SOU 2008:49, page 73. 
96 Andenas & Woolridge, page 110. 
97 Dotevall, SvJT 2006, page 888.  
98 Section 214, Insolvency Act 1986.  
99 Persons that formally are not directors, but is actually having  power in the company, e.g. 
a larger creditor (Dotevall, SvJT 2006, page 890). 
100 Dotevall, SvJT 2006, page 891. 
101 The balance sheet test is used to determine the status of the company, SOU 2008:49, 
page 74.   
102 Dotevall, SvJT 2006, page 891. 
103 (2001) BPIR 733. The board understood already in June 1991 that the company had 
financial problems. During a couple of months, the board worked towards a long-term 
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The commission has once suggested that the wrongful trading rule should be 
made into European standard. One of the reasons was that this makes the 
company management react earlier than if the duty to act is bound to the 
relation between the company’s capital and the share capital as is the case in 
ABL.104 
 
Another rule in the UK concerns fraudulent trading105. The rule is part of the 
UK company law but also of the insolvency law and means that anyone who is 
contributing to a fraud towards the company’s creditors will be guilty of 
fraudulent trading. The crime means fines or even prison, and possibly an 
obligation to pay damages.106 
 
Always to remember when discussing UK rules are that there are two parallel 
systems at once: equity and common law. Wrongful trading and fraudulent trading 
are both part of equity. Within common law, there is a correspondence to 
wrongful trading. Creditors may sue the directors of a company if the directors 
have failed to take the creditor’s interest into account when realizing (or when 
they should have realized) that the company might not be able to pay its debts. 
The base for the rule is the assumption that a company close to bankruptcy is 
operated on the creditors’ risk, not the company’s.107  
 
The Ltd is a very popular company form in the entire EU.108 To give an 
example, between the years 2003 and 2006 approximately 6.000 private 
companies has been formed every year by entrepreneurs living and doing 
business in Germany.109  
 
When giving credit to a smaller new Ltd it is quite common that the banks 
demand personal securities or an increased share capital.110  
4.2 France 
In France, there are two types of private limited liability companies111: the 
Société à responsabilité limité (SARL) and the Enterprise unipersonnelle à 
                                                                                                                        
solution and tried to understand weather the company was solvent or not. In December 
1991, the board finally concluded that the company was insolvent and applied for 
liquidation in March 1992. The court judged that even if the company was insolvent already 
in June, it would take knowledge of accounting not usually demanded from a member of 
the board in order to understand this. In section 214 IA it is clear that a board member 
should be aware of those circumstances that can be demanded from a reasonably diligent 
person with the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected 
of a person carrying out the same functions.  
104 COM/2003/284, see also MEMO/03/112.  
105 Section 213 Insolvency Act 1986.  
106 993 CA and section 213 Insolvency Act 1986.  
107 Dotevall, SvJT 2006, page 892. 
108 Dotevall, SvJT 2006, page 886. 
109 Armour, page 12. 
110 SOU 2008:49, page 73f. 
111 The public equivalence is the Société anonyme (SA) or the Société par actions simplifiée 
(SAS). 
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responsabilité limitée (EURL). The difference between the two is that a SARL 
has two or more owners112 while the EURL has only one. The rules for SARLs 
and EURLs are quite similar, but of course they are slightly more complicated 
for SARLs, since more persons are involved.  
 
When it comes to the minimum share capital requirement, it is one euro since 
2003. There is no maximum. Before 2003 the minimum share capital 
requirement was 7.500 euros and it is still quite common to have a share capital 
between 5.000-8.000 euros. Capital can be entered by cash or assets.113 At least 
20% of the share capital shall be paid when creating the SARL, unless it is 
contributed in kind, if so the whole transaction shall be completed at once. The 
share capital shall then be fully paid within five years.114  
 
If the annual balance sheet shows that the share capital is half of what it should 
be, an extra shareholders’ meeting shall be held within four months. This 
meeting will decide whether to liquidate the company or if the company should 
continue doing business. The financial situation of the company shall also be 
made public. If the managing director does not comply with these rules, he or 
she might be punished with fines and / or prison. If the extra shareholders’ 
meeting decides that the company should continue, the company has two years 
to make sure that the share capital is restored to at least half. If it isn’t, the 
company has the option to reduce the share capital. Otherwise, stakeholders 
might request that the company enter into liquidation.   
 
France also has rules regarding personal responsibility for directors if there is 
missing assets when the company is reconstructed, liquidated or bankrupted. 
For such a responsibility, faute de gestion, the reason of the shortage must be 
that the management has been careless.115 The responsibility can comprise of 
the whole or parts of the assets missing and it doesn’t matter how careless the 
management has been. Shadow directors can also be made responsible.116  
 
A general clause can be found in the French Code Civil that might have an 
impact on the responsibility for managers and others. The clause states that 
anyone who willfully, carelessly or by not knowing better created an 
economical damage is responsible for it.117 
4.3 Germany 
GmbH118 is the German form of private Limited Liability Company.119 It may 
be formed by one or more natural or legal persons for any lawful purpose.120 
                                                
112 However, a SARL may only have up to 100 members. If it has more members, it must 
be converted to a SA (Societé anonyme) within one year, Andenas & Woolridge, page 62.  
113 L 223-2 Code de Commerce 
114 SOU 2008:49, page 77.  
115 L 651-2, Code de Commerce. 
116 L 651-2 Code de Commerce. 
117 Art 1383 Code Civil. 
118 Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung. 
119 The public equivalence to GmbH is the Aktiengesellschaft, AG.  
120 Andenas & Woolridge, page 67. 
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The required minimum share capital is 25.000 euros and half of this amount 
shall be paid, in cash or contributed in kind, in order to be able to register the 
company.121 If the company has one owner; this person has to present the 
company with a security for the amount that was not paid when the GmbH 
was created.  
 
The amount of the share capital contribution by different shareholders may be 
different. The total nominal value of shares must correspond to the capital of 
the company in formation. Further, each shareholder may only acquire one 
share on formation.122  
 
There is one exception from the capital demand and this is the UG123, 
commonly known as the mini-GmbH. The mini-GmbH was introduced in 
2008 and can be registered even though the minimum share capital has not 
been paid if two terms are fulfilled. The first term is that the letter combination 
“UG” shall be put after “GmhB” in the name of the company. The second is 
that at least a quarter of the profit every year shall be dedicated to the share 
capital until the share capital is 25.000 euros. After this, the company can 
remove UG from its name and is a true GmbH.124  
 
An advantage of the mini-GmbH is that the founding is quite inexpensive and 
non-bureaucratic. The law provides a standard protocol that requires little 
information apart from the purpose of the company, the management board 
members and a list of shareholders. A notary must simply confirm the 
signatures on the protocol. Mini-GmbH:s may only have three shareholders, 
and cannot accumulate capital in anything but cash. When it comes to taxes 
there is no difference between GmbH:s and mini-GmbH:s.  
 
The managing director has a large responsibility to react if the company has 
financial problems. The MD shall call for an extra shareholders’ meeting if half 
of the share capital is not covered when looking at a balance sheet.125 Further, 
if the company cannot pay its current debts within three weeks, the MD shall 
apply for liquidation. If the MD does not apply, he or she will be personally 
liable for the company’s debts.126 
 
The management in a mini-GmbH is in principle personally liable for the 
commitments that arose during a time when the company was insolvent.127 
4.4 The U.S. 
Every State in the U.S. has an interest in making companies register in their 
state. The reasons are many and probably quite obvious, but I will mention one 
of them: the so called franchise tax. The franchise tax is a tax based on the 
                                                
121 5§ GmbHG 
122 Andenas & Woolridge, page 68. 
123 Unternehmergesellschaft 
124 www.mini-gmbh.de and GmbHG 
125 49§ GmbHG 
126 49§ and 64§ GmbH 
127 64§ GmbHG 
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registered share capital or the number of shares. The tax differs between 
different states but in e.g. Delaware this tax constitutes 20-25% of the total tax 
income for the state.128 Most states do not require any share capital at all.129 
 
In the U.S., company law is regulated in every state and I have chosen to focus 
on two set of rules. The first is the Revised Model Business Corporation Act 
(RMBCA), since this Act is a standard act implemented in the majority of the 
states. The second set of rules is the company law of Delaware, since most 
American companies are registered in this state because of its company friendly 
laws and competent courts. Since the rules regarding legal capital often touches 
insolvency issues, I will mention something about UFTA as well.  
 
The LLC, Limited Liability Company, is a very common company form in the 
U.S. that brings limited liability to the owners. More than 90% of the American 
States demands no share capital, based on the opinion that the minimum share 
capital amount was randomly picked and that it did not have any connection to 
the different corporations’ operations, and the risks connected with them. 
4.4.1 RMBCA and UFTA 
The Revised Model Business Corporation Act, RMBCA, demands that the 
company has enough capital, after paying dividends, to be able to pay its 
current expenses, such as the electrical bill. It also requires that the company 
have assets that at least correspond to the total debt of the company and 
demands from high ranked shareholders that may arise if the company is 
liquidated at the time for dividends. 
 
A shareholder’s contribution to the company does not have to be capital. It 
can also be services performed, contracts for services to be performed, or 
other securities of the corporation.130 The purpose of this is to make it easier to 
establish new business corporations.131  
 
Since the basis of U.S. law is that creditors have to protect themselves through 
their own initiatives, the insolvency rules are very important. The U.S. rules 
regarding creditor protection is based on a company’s possibility to operate in 
another state than the state it is registered in. Through the federal insolvency 
law, UFTA, the creditors enjoy the same protection no matter which state’s 
company law that is applicable.132  
 
Where the company law differs from state to state, the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act (UFTA) is not exposed to competition in the same way. The 
                                                
128 Dotevall, SvJT 2006, page 887. A franchise tax is forbidden in Europé according to a 
EU directive from 1969 (69/335/EC) 
129 Dotevall, SvJT 2006, page 892. Exceptions are few and none of these, except for Texas, 
are financially important for the US.  
130 RMBCA 6.21 (c)  
131 Dotevall, SvJT 2006, page 893 and Schön, The Future of Legal Capital, page 429ff.  
132 Dotevall, SvJT 2006, page 894f.  
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fraudulent transfers concerns two types of transactions where the management 
can be personally liable:133  
1. Transactions that aim at destroying, delaying or defraud creditors.  
2. Transactions that means that one of the parties did not receive a reasonable 
equivalent value, if at the same time the company in question directly after the 
transaction has an unreasonable small capital or does not have enough cash to 
pay its expenses. An example of this is paying dividends.  
 
Since it might be very difficult to present evidence of the above, the UFTA is 
not a very effective protection for the creditors.134  
 
When it comes to transaction costs, banks often enter into financial covenants 
with corporate borrowers that include provisions on the financial structure of 
the borrower and, with a view to the investment, may limit the ability of the 
company to distribute dividend.135  
4.4.2 Delaware 
During more than seventy years, the states in the U.S. have competed over 
companies. Delaware is the most successful of these states, for many reasons. 
The legislation is considered very company friendly. Judges and company 
lawyers are the best regarding company issues and the registration authority in 
Delaware is very efficient.136 
 
Delaware responds fast to embrace the demands of corporate decision makers. 
Only a few legislative projects rank higher than the amendment of the 
corporate statute and in order to amend the corporation code the Constitution 
requires a super-majority of both houses of Delaware’s General Assembly. It is 
a corporate law provider credibly committed to the needs of the business 
community and Delaware has developed an extensive body of case law, 
administrative expertise and judicial expertise. The Delaware law is less 
procedural than other state law in the US and hence it is an attractive state in 
which to register a company. The majority of US companies listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange are indeed registered in Delaware.137 There are clear 
taxation advantages to incorporation in Delaware. No tax is charged in 
Delaware on turnover, provided that the company’s business is conducted in 
another state.  
 
Delaware is generally more shareholder friendly than creditor friendly, but 
creditors still have a certain protection from the owner-centered construction 
of the fiduciary duty. The fiduciary duty means that primarily the owners demand 
responsibility from the board and other leaders if gross negligence can be 
shown, e.g. the board failed to keep themselves informed of important 
transactions and this led to a negative result for the company or when the 
                                                
133 Sections 4 and 5, UFTA.  
134 Dotevall, SvJT 2006, page 893. 
135 Schön, page 7.  
136 E.g. Dotevall, SvJT 2006, page 887, Mallin, page 44 
137 Mallin, page 44.  
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company has benefitted the owners even though it was close to bankruptcy.138 
Furthermore, the DLLCA requires that debts are covered in the balance sheet, 
but it does not require that the company is able to pay its current expenses.  
 
 
                                                
138 Kraakman et al., page 84.  
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5 The many discussions in 
literature 
5.1 Creditor protection and transaction costs 
Quite a large part of this essay has been dedicated to the share capital as a 
means of creditor protection. Some authors mean that this is the most 
important part of the minimum share capital requirement, while others think 
that there are other, better, ways of protecting creditors or letting the creditors 
protect themselves.  
 
Creditor protection is more complex than, e.g. shareholder protection, since it 
touches on many areas of law such as contracts, property, tort, civil procedure, 
criminal, company, accounting, securities and insolvency law. A further 
problem is the various types of creditors, such as adjusting (voluntary) and 
non-adjusting (involuntary) creditors, or weak and strong creditors.139  
 
The distribution rules of the SPE Statute shift the focus notably from flexibility 
for the shareholders towards protection of creditors, which may or may not be 
an indicator of the future European legislation.140 
5.1.1 General discussion in literature 
As mentioned above141, the European Commission believes that creditors 
nowadays are more interested in other aspects that are relevant to solvency, 
such as cash flow, rather than the share capital. Kraakman et al. also writes that  
“It seems unlikely that the minimum capital requirements provide any real protection to 
creditors, as a firm’s initial capital is likely to be long gone if it files for bankruptcy”142.  
 
Given that the capital provided can be used up within a short time after the 
company has been formed, minimum capital requirements might not inform 
creditors about the assets of the company, except perhaps during a short 
period of time.143  
 
Schön suggests a mixture of the various concepts concerning creditor 
protection in the share capital point of view. Statutory rules on the provision 
and maintenance of the company’s capital and individual credit agreement are 
not mutually exclusive. They can complement each other. By specifying a 
certain share capital the founders declare that they are willing to provide a 
certain amount of assets. A first signal of creditworthiness is thus established 
                                                
139 Siems et al, page 3. 
140 Siems et al, page 9. 
141 See CHAPTER XXX 
142 Kraakman et al, page 131.  
143 Schön, page 437. 
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which might facilitate access to more capital from investors, who then might 
enter into individual agreements with the company.  
 
The question concerning transaction costs thus sum up with if it should be 
helped by legislation or handled by the free market. In Sweden, the legislators 
strive for the legislation to help minimize transaction costs, at least for smaller 
companies where 50.000 SEK is enough guarantee for a creditor or supplier. 
In other countries, such as the U.S., the creditors and suppliers are believed to 
know best themselves what they need in order to give credit or sell goods. The 
critical question is how well creditors are able to deal with the issue of 
transaction costs on their own.144  
 
Mulbert and Birke makes the following remarks when discussing share capital 
in the aspect of creditor protection:145 
• If share capital rules really did provide benefits to creditors, creditors 
would presumably pay for them in form of lower risk premiums 
demanded from corporations.  
• If share capital rules does not provide any benefit to creditors, but were 
costly to firms, one could expect that there would be incentives for 
firms under the scope of the share capital regimes to minimize the 
harmful effects by choosing the absolute minimum capital required. 
However, it has been shown that firms choose share capital figures 
significantly higher than the minimum requirement.  
 
Disclosure obligations are another way of protecting creditors, since they help 
creditors to determine the creditworthiness of a company.146  
 
When discussing Director’s duties it is possible that they protect creditors. In 
continental Europe directors not only have to focus on the interest of the 
shareholders but also have to balance them with the social and financial 
interests of employees, consumers and creditors. Also elsewhere, when 
insolvency threatens, creditor protection comes into the foreground. Directors 
may be obliged to take creditor interest into account, to file for bankruptcy or 
to refrain from entering into undervalue transactions or other operations. If 
directors violate these obligations, they may be personally liable.147  
 
A large part of creditor protection is the insolvency law of the country. It may 
give creditors a right to take part in insolvency proceedings, how to deal with 
the relationship between different creditors and give creditors the right to 
challenge payments made by the company to other creditors (or shareholders) 
shortly before the insolvency.148  
 
Prof. Enriques and Gelter has a very clear view of the minimum capital 
requirement and writes that: 
                                                
144 Enriques and Gelter, page 7.  
145 Mulbert and Birke, page 13-14 
146 Siems et al, page 5. 
147 Siems et al, page 4. 
148 Siems et al, page 5.  
 38 
“The merits of minimum capital requirements in actually protecting creditors are doubtful 
(…). Even supporters of the legal capital requirement seem to concede that their function does 
not lie in protecting creditors from the risk of substantial losses resulting from an unfavorable 
business development, but rather in signaling seriousness to the market, thus erecting a barrier 
against the creation of corporations with an unreasonable amount of backing by 
shareholders.”149  
5.1.2 Adjustable and non-adjustable creditors 
Adjustable creditors can make use of the possibilities provided by the 
applicable contract law in order to protect themselves. Moreover, contractual 
partners often ask for additional protection but they may also depend on the 
property law of the country in question. In the latter case, the important thing 
is that the supplier may retain title of the goods until full payment. When it 
comes to enforcement, some security interest allows self-enforcement; other 
cases may be dependent on court proceedings or law enforcement. In some 
special cases, debtors may also face criminal sanctions, e.g. due to fraudulent 
behavior.150 
 
When it comes to weak creditors, maybe these groups are not as helpless as 
they might appear. It is important to notice that to this group of creditors the 
liquidity of the debtor is the primary focus of attention, not so much the 
debtor company’s situation according to its balance sheet. In this era of 
modern technology, reliable information regarding the debtor’s history of 
meeting credit obligations may be quickly obtained. Also, many trade creditors 
will be able to retain title of the goods they provided to the debtor as collateral 
for their trade credit. These weak, but by definition adjustable, creditors might 
further be able to free ride on many of the restrictions that the stronger 
creditors can impose by way of covenants or credit agreements.151 However, 
Schön152 believes that the argument that such creditors are only interested in 
the present liquidity of the company is unconvincing since in times of crisis, 
also tradesmen and service-providers have to wait a considerable amount of 
time before their claims are satisfied. To free ride on stronger creditors might 
not be a solution, since these creditors often make new individual agreement 
when the debtor company is in a crisis. Violations of credit covenants typically 
causes the debt to come due sooner than it otherwise would. 
 
For non-adjustable creditors (primarily torts) the case is a bit different from the 
weak creditors’. They are not able to take the debtor company’s financial 
situation into account before becoming a creditor. The overriding risk that 
these creditors face is default and insolvency of the debtor company.153 Some 
authors154 compare the risk with any risk created when doing business with a 
natural person, since the assets of a natural person are as finite as those of 
corporations.   
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With regard to these non-adjustable creditors, the minimum share capital 
requirement might only be of symbolic importance. This is because neither 
legislator not the responsible authorities are able to determine the amount of 
capital necessary to cover a company’s future liabilities, at least not in a reliable 
manner.155 A solution to this might be that for particularly risky enterprises it 
should be mandatory to get insurance.156 
 
Some creditors, the non-adjusting ones, do not have the possibility to judge for 
themselves whether a company is a quality-company or not. However, if 
considering the State’s tax claims157, no company is able to finance its 
commencement of operations solely on unpaid tax claims, sins these claims do 
not arise until taxable events take place in the course of business. Thus, the 
initial finance will come from adjusting creditors who hopefully have screened 
the company before financing it. The point when tax claims are used to finance 
a business may be when the financial difficulties emerge. Unpaid tax money 
may be used to finance the continuation of operations after the point when the 
company should have been liquidated. At this stage, most often also the equity 
capital is lost. Thus, a minimum share capital requirement is irrelevant to the 
State as a tax creditor.158  
 
The argument that the creditor protection rules might be seen as a standard 
contract is also under debate. Some authors mean that today’s rules do not 
affect the contracts since the creditors have a tendency to agree on other 
protection than the one given through legislation.159 
5.1.3 Transaction costs 
An argument in favour of a minimum share capital is that the transaction costs 
will increase if the requirement is removed. This would be because banks, 
creditors and suppliers will need some kind of guarantee that the company will 
be able to pay its debts in the future. Transaction costs will thus increase since 
these stakeholders will need to examine their business partner and possibly 
create more elaborate contracts regarding securities and other special terms.  
 
Individual agreements between creditors and the company might however be 
far better suited to handle the financial needs of individual creditors, than 
general rules on the provisions and maintenance of capital. When it comes to 
interest rates, risks, and that fact that figures used are based on the time when 
the credit is extended, not when the company was formed an individual 
contract is probably the best one to regulate the specific business transaction.160 
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That U.S. bond covenants contain restrictions on distributions that UK bond 
covenants do not could possibly mean that firms in the UK are saved 
transaction costs by the share capital rules. However, some statements from 
large UK creditors that the legal capital of a debtor does not factor in their 
credit decision point in the opposite direction.161 
5.1.4 The debate in Sweden 
In Sweden, the debate concerning the share capital as means of a creditor 
protection have been active for many years. In 1994, Sacklén concluded that 
the share capital and capital maintenance rules do have a purpose, however 
they could be better. He does not however present any suggestions on how to 
improve the rules.162 Nerep did not agree with Sacklén in an article also from 
1994. He believes that the capital rules have a purpose in protecting weak and 
non-adjusting creditors and in completing contracts.163  
 
Andersson asks himself two questions: The first one is whether the creditors 
are capable to take care of their own interests and if they are actually doing so. 
He concludes that they are and for those cases when enough protection is not 
possible through an individual contract, the rules in ABL are anyway not 
sufficient. Andersson’s second question is what real protection the creditor 
protection rules in ABL are actually giving. None, Andersson writes and also 
states that the size of the share capital has no connection to the risks of the 
business and thus it is pointless as a means of creditor protection.164 Andersson 
later suggest that the U.S. model could be applied also in Sweden with good 
results.165  
 
In an article from 2006, Skog believes that it is time to remove the minimum 
share capital requirement for private limited companies. This is because the 
lack of thorough and substantial analysis concerning these rules. To mean that 
it functions as an entry barrier in order to stop non-serious entrepreneurs from 
access to limited responsibility is not an argument since there are other ways of 
proving seriousness. The share capital must be based upon the shareholders 
interest, the art and risks of operations and that when giving credit to a 
company, the share capital is not as important as the company’s ability to pay 
the debt when it is due.166    
 
The last Swedish author I will mention is Forsebäck who also believes that the 
minimum share capital rules should be abolished. She also believes that rules 
similar to the U.S. rules would create a balance between shareholders and 
creditors. She believes that more disclosure of information on e.g. the 
company’s website would create a fully functional creditor protection system. 
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That way, the creditor would have access to credit ratings and other similar 
information.167 
5.2 The status of the AB 
5.2.1 Introduction 
If one find it important that the AB uphold its status as a trustworthy, serious 
company, there should definitely be ways to ensure that the company is 
actually serious. The European Commission recognizes this issue in the SPE 
Statute – The Commission’s Draft. The Commission mentions that SMEs are 
also hindered in their cross-border development by the lack of trust in certain 
foreign company forms in other Member States. This problem exists mainly in 
relation to the less widely known company forms.168 
 
It has at times been quite hard to find information regarding how other 
countries look upon the status of their limited liability companies. However, by 
studying the legislation, explanatory material regarding the different company 
forms, literature and articles I conclude that most European countries and the 
EU find it very important that their limited liability company form is perceived 
as a serious one and is not used for illegitimate purposes.  
5.2.2 The share capital as a signaling instrument 
As quoted above, professors Enriques and Gelter believes that the merit of the 
minimal capital requirement is that it is signaling seriousness to the market.169 
 
 Mulbert and Birke are no strangers to the idea that the share capital rules may 
serve a function by providing a valuable signaling device for corporations to 
improve their position in the credit markets. They also believe that this 
explanation might equally apply to the minimum share capital required by law, 
especially since the founders are free to choose whether to risk the stipulated 
minimum amount. In this way the founders are signaling that they have a 
certain degree of optimism for the company’s success, even if they opt for the 
minimum share capital required. Therefore, when shareholders make their 
contributions, there is reason to believe that they are convinced that they will 
get some sort of return on their investment.170 
 
It is not clear whether creditors actually perceive equity contributions as a 
signal of confidence or whether they interpret them differently. And while 
financing the corporation with additional equity still might show that the 
shareholders are confident about the business prospects, so would debt 
financing. Debt financing would possibly signal that the firm is doing well is 
able to repay larger amounts of debt and that the probability of bankruptcy has 
decreased. By using external debt financing, the company would also signal 
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that a third party believes in the business. Also to be taken into account is the 
fact that a shareholders’ contribution might simply signal that the company 
cannot get financing from a third party.171 
 
Facilitating access to limited liability may result in would-be-entrepreneurs 
coming forward with more marginal projects, in terms of quality. If these 
companies will be financed depend on the ability of private creditors to 
determine the prospects of the company in question.172 Even with a minimum 
share capital requirement of e.g. one euro, an entrepreneur may always credibly 
signal the quality of his or her (future) company, e.g. by committing personal 
funds to the company or by standing guarantor for the company’s debts.173  
 
Mulbert and Birke summarizes the discussion concerning the share capital 
rules as a signaling instrument with saying that it is not very likely that the 
capital raising and maintenance rules offer firms a useful signaling instrument. 
However, if the share capital rules were to serve as a basis for shareholder 
signaling by way of choosing a certain amount of legal capital, there might be 
reasons to believe that they could not be easily replaced by private contracts.174 
5.3 Capital maintenance 
The restrictions of distributions imposed on firms are at the core of the share 
capital rules and the share capital further has some importance when it comes 
to having control of a company’s finances. This control is obviously important 
for creditors, but also for employees, owners, suppliers and others doing 
business with the company.  
 
Once a corporation has become insolvent, the share capital rules do not 
provide any protection to creditors, because in the event of insolvency (at least 
under the balance sheet test) by definition there is little or no equity capital left. 
Share capital rules can then only reduce creditor costs from insolvency, if they 
provide and preserve an “equity cushion”.175 
 
Even in a company with high initial equity capital, there is no guaranty that the 
capital is available to creditors at any other point in time other then at the time 
of registration. It cannot insure creditors against the loss of capital because of 
business reasons or bad management performance.176  
 
In Sweden, this control is primarily done by a special balance sheet and rules 
regarding dividend. In other countries, different kinds of balance sheet tests are 
necessary or the matter is regulated in insolvency law.  
 
When it comes to dividend, no changes in ABL should be necessary. If 17:3 
ABL is respected, a company cannot pay dividend unless it is defensible when 
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considering the art, extent and risks of operations. This rule should of course 
also apply to companies with a very small or no share capital.  
 
Furthermore, we have the construction of wrongful trading to consider. This 
construction brings a responsibility to owners if they continue to do business 
knowing that their company is insolvent. “Wrongful trading” is however a bit 
complicated since it brings difficult evidence situations. When it comes to 
Sweden, the same problem arises when it comes to deciding the time when the 
management should have realized that they need to create a special balance 
sheet.177 The Swedish rules regarding responsibility at capital losses differs from 
wrongful trading since it is not related to a test in order to decide if the 
company risks insolvency or if the capital loss is strictly related to the 
relationship between the company’s total  equity capital and registered share 
capital. The Swedish rules might mean that the Director’s duty to take the 
creditors’ interests into account applies later than if the duty is connected to a 
risk of insolvency.178  
 
The system of capital maintenance cannot protect the company’s capital 
against losses incurred in the course of business. However, it can protect the 
company’s capital against opportunism on the part of shareholders who might 
be tempted to strip the company of its assets once the company has incurred 
liabilities towards third parties.179  
 
I have not earlier mentioned Finland, but when a Finnish company’s share 
capital is negative, the company has to make a report of this and the status of 
the company is made public, so that all the affected parties can see it.180  
 
Because of the small size of the required minimum capital, the creditor 
protection in regards to distributions is negligible in any but the smallest firms. 
In larger corporation, using the minimum share capital, shareholders are still 
able to pay out an amount of assets that leaves only an equity cushion that is 
very small in relation to the business operations. However, analyses of bond 
covenants show that creditors prefer to relate the permissibility of distributions 
to the real (not accounting) earnings of the corporation.181 This brings us to the 
discussion regarding the balance sheet test versus the suggested solvency test.  
5.4 The balance sheet test or the solvency test? 
The balance sheet test means that for a distribution to be lawful it must be less 
than or equal to the surplus of assets over liabilities, treating share capital as a 
liability. Thus, the company must have assets equal to its share capital when 
paying dividends. According to the Second Company Directive, there is usually 
no room for any intermediate managerial appreciation, appraisal or adjustment 
of the accounting result to take account of prudential judgment. However, 
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since the Directive sets a minimum requirement only, the Member States may 
add rules to make sure that dividends are not being paid on the mere basis of a 
balance sheet.182 
 
The balance sheet test has been criticized since the balance sheet, and accounts 
in general, are not designed to determine the amount appropriate for 
distributions. Accountants struggle to summarize the infinite diversity of 
business in a set of comparable numbers. It might be meant to be read with a 
Director’s report and/or cash-flow statements. Accounts are also a single 
snapshot of a point in time.183   
 
The idea of the solvency test is to impose conduct or behavioral standards and 
procedural hurdles at the time of distribution decisions to ensure that 
commitments were not entered into without appropriate assurances that they 
would not unduly endanger solvency. The role of the share capital would not 
be to ensure that there is enough capital in the company. The security would 
be achieved by requiring an assurance of ongoing solvency.184  
 
When discussing the solvency test, three issues should be addressed:185 
• How to guarantee the accurateness of a solvency statement. 
• Whether market values or book values should be used. 
• Whether one should demand that the relevant values have consistently 
been used by the company in its financial statements.  
  
In the SPE Statute, a balance test is required and a solvency test voluntary. It is 
up to the different Member States to decide which system they wish to use.  
5.5 The minimum amount  
In Europe, there have been an interesting couple of years where many 
countries have lowered their required minimum share capital. Sweden chose to 
reduce the share capital from 100 000 SEK to 50 000 SEK in 2008 and it was 
discussed that is should be lowered to 20 000 SEK or removed completely. 
The reasons for the chosen amount are stated in the second chapter but were 
primarily that a reduction to less than 50.000 SEK would increase the demands 
from creditors for securities, capital contributions and information. The 
Inquiry also believed that it was an appropriate amount out of the perspective 
that some creditors cannot make individual deals with the company, that it 
would function well as a general barrier to entry and that the lower the capital 
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requirement is, the greater is the risk of the company entering into an 
involuntary liquidation situation which should be avoided.186 
 
Schön firmly states that there is no meaningful link between the financial needs 
of an individual enterprise and the amount of share capital prescribed by 
statutory law. Further, this is not due simply to the fact that the diversity of 
existing corporations necessarily prevents lawmakers from tailoring share 
capital requirements to fit the financial needs of the individual company. This 
is also a generally accepted fact that one cannot make any objective statements 
concerning the extent to which a company should be financed by means of 
equity rather than debt.187 
 
Mulbert and Birke write about a seriousness test in regard to the Second 
Company Directive: 
“It can be argued that the requirement to post a legal capital will prevent the formation of 
corporations whose business lacks any potential for success. In other words, it would make it 
expensive to form a corporation without a serious business purpose. (…) Thus, the legal 
capital regime may serve the function of a seriousness-test before the formation of the 
corporation, but it is not a very tough test.”188  
 
The mere existence of the corporate form with its prevalent feature of limited 
shareholder liability may serve as an incentive to carry out dangerous, accident 
prone activities through a, maybe undercapitalized, corporation. The same 
risky activity could be carried out by a natural person with insufficient assets to 
cover potential future liabilities. No matter which, a tort victim would be left 
with only one debtor unable to repay its debt. The problem is therefore not a 
problem peculiar to corporations, but simply a general problem of the creditor 
/ debtor relationship.189  
 
A minimum share capital requirement imposes an entry price for limited 
liability. The effect of such a restriction is most likely to be felt by small firms. 
For these firms, usually owner-managed, limited liability is not used to reduce 
risk bearing costs by permitting shareholders to diversify, as it is for listed 
companies. Rather, the principal benefit brought by limited liability is probably 
the reduction in risk it offers to entrepreneurs. The willingness of marginal 
individuals to engage in entrepreneurial activity appears to be affected by the 
actual or perceived risks of such endeavor.190 
5.6 The future in Europe 
The most traditional and popular justification for harmonization of EU 
company law is that EU corporate law is needed to avoid the race to the 
bottom that would be a result of Member States’ unchecked freedom to 
regulate (or not regulate) corporations as they wish.191 However, many 
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opponents of the European share capital rules point to the U.S. and the 
practical elimination of share capital rules there.192 If comparing the EU to the 
U.S. where most of the companies are incorporated in Delaware, scholars seem 
to disagree whether Delaware´s primacy is a good or a bad thing. Those who 
believe that it is a race to the top hold that companies choose to incorporate in 
stated where the rules maximize their value through a mix of shareholder 
protection and deference to management’s business judgment. The race to the 
bottom believers counter that states create company law to accommodate only 
the interests of those who get to decide where to incorporate and the result is 
weak shareholder protection.193 
 
Enriques and Gatti writes that since it might be impossible to predict what will 
prove to be attractive for companies, the EU as the harmonizing authority will 
have to regulate either the potential ones that they can see or try to ban all 
possible attractive features. This road will probably lead to massive legislation 
and a high degree of inflexibility.194 How do you create a legislation that suits 
all kinds of corporations? The conclusion, according to Enriques and Gatti, is 
that in order to prevent a race to the bottom, harmonization would decrease 
the degree of flexibility in management and governance.195   
 
Possibly the EU has two ways to go. It can either expand the scope of legal 
capital rules contained in the Second Company directive or move in the 
opposite direction and propose the complete elimination of legal capital rules, 
even in regard to public limited companies. The first alternative would mean 
that the EU could prevent firms from circumventing the legal capital rules of 
their local jurisdiction by incorporating in another Member State.196  
 
The public limited European Company is not a success and the comparison of 
the three SPE drafts197 shows how difficult it is to harmonize instruments 
regarding e.g. creditor protection in the area of company law. Many 
stipulations of the SPE statute which were supposed to be generally applicable 
in all Member States became more and more diluted during the negotiation 
process, with the result that in the Presidency Compromise the formerly 
harmonized issues such as the minimum share capital requirement finally 
became subject of law in the individual Member State.198 Further, under all 27 
legal systems and countries that are involved in the EU, a domestic form of 
private limited company exists, which may compete with the SPE. To avoid 
such a competition, it is possible that each Member State tries to transfer as 
much of its own law into the national SPE Statute as possible.199 
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However, the EU had managed to harmonize some legislation which affects 
company’s doing business within the EU. Under the regime of Rome I200 the 
main principle in international contract law is still the autonomous choice of 
law of the parties involved. If the parties have not included a governing law in 
their agreement, Rome I provide several options depending on the matter of 
the contract.201 Also Rome II202 set up a unified regime to determine the law 
applicable to non-contractual claims. Normally, the law of the Member State 
where the creditor has its residence will be applicable. This unification has 
strengthened the position of creditors of non-contractual claims by mitigating 
the problem of conflict-of-law rules in different Member States.203  
 
Professors Enriques and Gatti concludes that even if harmonization can be 
justified in theory to correct market failures that the member States are either 
unwilling or unable to correct themselves, and provided that the new 
harmonized rules would make society better-off, there is no reason to believe 
that EC institutions are any better positioned than national lawmakers to tackle 
market failures.204 
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6 Final discussion and suggestions 
6.1 In general  
Should Sweden keep the regulation regarding the minimum share capital requirement as it is 
or should changes be made? 
 
The above was the question that I asked myself in the introduction and the 
analysis of this question is at the heart of the purpose with this thesis. Which 
way should Sweden choose to go? This chapter will primarily discuss the 
function of the share capital in Sweden using the examples from other 
countries above. I will also discuss some of the principles in general since this 
is relevant also in the Swedish context.  
 
When deciding upon this subject to write my essay on, I was sure to find 
strong and deliberate arguments from the legislators on why we have a 
minimum share capital requirement in Sweden and why the level is set at 
50.000 SEK for a private limited company. However, I have found that this is 
not the case. Not even the legislators know why the amount 50.000 SEK is the 
appropriate amount. The Inquiry’s comment that creditors will be more likely 
to demand special securities or contracts if the amount is less than 50.000 SEK 
is taken from nowhere.   
6.2 Seriousness and signals 
What is important when making sure that an entrepreneur is serious? 
According to Swedish legislative history, an entrepreneur is serious when he or 
she is willing to commit capital to his or her company. I find that I come to 
think of other ways as well, such as paying taxes on time and properly manage 
economy and book-keeping. To have a third party, such as an auditor or a 
bank, saying that everything is according to rules. To disclose important 
information voluntarily and make it easy to access or to make sure that a 
serious third party believes in your business idea.  
 
I have a more difficult time accepting that smaller Swedish companies no 
longer need an auditor than I have accepting a removal of the rules of a 
minimum share capital and I believe that the abolition of accountant 
requirement for smaller companies has led to much larger transaction costs 
than an abolition of a share capital requirement will.  
 
To me, a share capital does not necessary prove that you are a serious 
businessperson. You are willing to invest 50.000 SEK in your company, but 
what does that mean? For some people 50.000 SEK is a very large 
commitment, for others it does not mean much. That a third party, such as a 
bank, is willing to invest in the company would mean more to me since this 
bank will have tested the business idea. Obviously, third parties do finance 
many of the smaller companies already today, but then usually by giving the 
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loan to the person in question and not to the company. In my view, debt 
financing would signal a trustworthy company much more than a share capital.  
 
However, none of the countries mentioned in this thesis allows debt financing 
when forming your company (of course it is allowed that a person takes a loan 
that is used to finance the company – but this is not the same thing) and 
probably the market wouldn’t be too interested in giving loans to a limited 
responsibility company with no assets. But as a signaling instrument, I find 
debt financing very credible.  
 
I am also very interested in the concept of mandatory insurances. For 
companies dealing with large amount of consumer capital, such as building 
contractors, this would be an interesting way of protecting the consumer’s 
money. Obviously, it would not encourage more people to start this kind of 
companies, since the insurance would probably be quite costly. But it is an 
example where the share capital has no meaning (e.g. 50 000 as share capital 
when building a private home for three million), where the creditors (in this 
case the consumer) are adjusting but also mostly very weak and where the 
consequences of a company not paying its debts (or performing work they 
have been paid for) might be of a huge consequence for the individual 
consumer. Let me conclude by stating that this insurance would only be for 
companies dealing with private consumers and, in relation to private 
consumers when larger amounts of money are involved.  
6.3 Creditor protection – a believable 
argument? 
I believe that the free market protects itself best and that creditors and 
suppliers should not be too protected by legislation, but be free to themselves 
decide how a contract should be drawn up. Thus, I also believe that the market 
operators such as companies, banks and customers are very well suited to 
decide on their own how to run their business and which risks to take. 
Consumers should be protected and today we have, at least in Sweden, special 
laws concerning this consumer protection. Other groups that deserve 
protection are of course employees that sometimes have a hard time to control 
or affect the company and their own situation. As we have seen in the US and 
the UK, creditors are fully able to take care of themselves.  
 
I am also quite sure that no bank gives out loans to a company simply because 
the company has a share capital. Other markers such as turnover, cash flow or 
how the bank sees the company’s future is of greater importance, which is also 
the opinion of the European Commission and the Swedish government. 
 
As has been mentioned above, one must differ between adjustable and non-
adjustable creditors and weak and strong creditors. But we have also seen that 
the arguments for protecting these creditors via the share capital are not 
complete. This since if a company is in a financial crisis, the share capital will 
be long gone. Personal responsibility for board members only apply if they 
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have been negligent somewhere in the process and if this is the case the 
members are still only responsible for debts created after that critical time.  
 
To replace the balance sheet test with a solvency test seems very appropriate. 
As mentioned by several authors, the book-keeping are not meant to make 
business decisions, the people are. When using the balance sheet test, the 
numbers decide about e.g. dividend, when actually companies are hiring 
experiences professionals to make exactly that type of decisions. With the 
solvency test, their business judgment would be allowed more sway. It would 
also allow for more capital protection, since it is not allowed to pay dividends 
even if the numbers seem to approve of it, if a director should know better.  
 
Sweden should also look at the concept wrongful trading, that was actually 
suggested as a common standard by the EU once. By using this legal 
construction, management and others could be responsible for a company’s 
commitments that were made after the person in question understood that 
there was no reasonable prospect that the company would avoid entering into 
insolvent liquidation. Because of wrongful trading, it has become very 
important for managers and others in a leading position to keep themselves 
informed about the company’s finances and book-keeping. The rule has also 
been said to prevent that no company is created with too little capital. I do not 
completely buy that argument since the disadvantage of the wrongful trading, 
as with many other company issues, are to actually provide evidence that 
wrongful trading is at hand.  
 
To conclude the discussion concerning share capital as a means of protecting 
creditors, I would say that in theory it would work. If the company actually did 
not touch the share capital even when in a financial crisis, there would be 
money to use. However, since there need not be any relation between the 
amount of the share capital and the risks of operations, the total share capital 
might not even be sufficient to pay one single creditor. In reality, most 
companies have already used up the share capital when it is liquidated and 
sometimes the share capital is gone before even the board understood that the 
company had serious financial problems. In these cases, the share capital does 
not work as a creditor protector at all. It is actually quite meaningless.  
 
However, since most authors as well as the Swedish government seem to agree 
that creditor protection is no longer one of the most important aspects of the 
share capital, I will leave the discussion at that.   
6.4 A price tag on limited liability? 
To relate money to seriousness seems completely absurd to me. It would be 
much better if the company (and the entrepreneur) was controlled in other 
ways, such as via auditors or the tax declaration. As a suggestion, a company 
that cannot handle this declaration two times in a row or three times during the 
same year should not be able to continue to be an AB. If the owners are not 
able to declare or pay taxes on time, they are not serious enough to deserve 
protection in the form of limited responsibility. Thus, the owners of such a 
company should immediately be personally liable for the company’s 
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commitments, e.g. for the entire year. Rules like these are already in existence, 
both in Sweden and in many other countries, both countries with a share 
capital requirement and in those without.  
 
The greatest advantage of the AB is that the company’s finances are separated 
from the owners’ finances.  
 
I find it very unfair and completely opposite of the goal of the Swedish 
government, that more companies should be started, that you are actually able 
to buy limited responsibility. It should be earned.  
6.5 Adjusting to the EU 
The EU obviously has to be taken into consideration when discussing national 
Swedish legislation.   
 
What consequences will there be if the SPE company enters into force? As 
described earlier, it is up to every Member State to decide what the minimum 
share capital should be, from one euro to 8,000 euros. Sweden, and other 
European countries thus has a quite interesting choice to make. The national 
SPE statute may be very similar to the domestic private limited liability 
companies, thus creating two very similar company forms. Reasons for doing 
this might be to avoid two competing private company forms. Obviously, if 
this path is chosen, the SPE company will make a very small impact on the 
European market. The advantage will be the ability to move between countries 
but, as we have seen with the SE company, the tax issue needs to be resolved.  
 
If however Sweden were to choose to create two company forms: to keep the 
AB in its present form and decide that the minimum share capital for a SPE 
company is one euro, then we might look at an interesting future. The AB 
could then be primarily for companies wishing to operate within Sweden and 
the SPE for companies wishing to operate in the EU. That way, there would 
also be two company forms for entrepreneurs wishing limited responsibility: 
one with a minimum share capital requirement of 50 000 SEK and another 
with one euro. However, I find it important not to create a company form 
which is judged as less serious and the best would be if the share capital 
requirements were similar, and low, for both companies.  
 
It might be a problem that foreign companies are treated as less serious than 
Swedish ones in Sweden. To avoid this, there would need to be an information 
campaign or similar to increase awareness of the SPE and what it stands for.  
 
If there will be a race to the bottom, Sweden will have to make some changes 
in order to keep up with some other European countries that are much more 
company-friendly. Sweden has however taken some initiatives by removing the 
audit obligation for smaller companies and by lowering the share capital 
requirement. But there is still a long way to go if Sweden wishes to compete 
with the Ltd in the UK. 
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6.6 Final remarks 
Obviously, the Swedish legal construction becomes quite meaningless if the 
share capital was lowered to one SEK, and the rules in ABL would need to be 
changed. It would be quite ridiculous to keep the special balance sheet and be 
obliged to create such a sheet when the share capital is half on one SEK. 
Another construction would be necessary and I find the solvency test idea 
quite appealing. Sweden could also look for guidance in the SPE statute where 
a balance sheet test is necessary and a solvency test voluntary.  
  
Obviously, the market will not accept to make business, at least not on credit, 
with companies without a capital. The equity cushion would still be very much 
relevant, but as a means for business partners to evaluate each other. 
 
 
I hope that this thesis has presented the reader with other possibilities for 
gaining real creditor protection, the different attitudes towards transaction 
costs, other ways of making sure an AB is serious and ways to control a 
company’s finances. I finally hope that the reader of this essay find these ways 
more reasonable than the minimum share capital requirement and agree that 
the minimum share capital requirement in Swedish law should be abolished, in 
the spirit of true entrepreneurship.  
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